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What Drives
Productivity Growth?
n 1995, the U.S. economy started to experience a strong 
resurgence in labor productivity growth. After growing only 
1.3 percent per year from 1973 to 1995, labor productivity 
growth jumped to 2.5 percent from 1995 to 1999 (see chart).1 
This striking revival has hardly gone unnoticed, with 
academics, policymakers, and the financial press hotly debating 
competing explanations. Some commentators emphasize rapid 
capital accumulation and the recent investment boom, others 
point to deeper factors like fundamental technological change 
in high-tech industries, and still others argue that cyclical 
forces provide the primary explanation.2
This debate about the forces driving the U.S. economy 
mirrors a larger debate between the neoclassical and new 
growth theories regarding the sources of economic growth. 
Economists have long disagreed about this vital question, and 
the recent U.S. productivity revival presents an opportune 
backdrop to review this debate.
In the neoclassical view, broadly defined capital 
accumulation drives growth in the short run, but capital 
eventually succumbs to diminishing returns, so long-run 
productivity growth is entirely due to exogenous technical 
progress. The new growth theory, however, moves beyond this 
unsatisfying conclusion, arguing that productivity growth can 
continue indefinitely without the elixir of exogenous, and 
entirely unexplained, technical progress. Either by avoiding 
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• Neoclassical and “new growth” theories offer 
alternative explanations for productivity and 
output growth.
• In the neoclassical view, exogenous
technical progress drives long-run productivity 
growth since broadly defined capital
suffers from diminishing returns. In contrast, 
the new growth models yield long-run
growth endogenously, either by avoiding 
diminishing returns to capital or by
explaining technical progress 
internally.
• Despite their differences, both views help
to explain the recent rise in U.S. productivity 
growth. The methodological tools 
developed by neoclassical economists 
provide a means to measure the rate of 
technical progress, while the models of
the new growth economists can provide 
an internal explanation for technical 
progress.
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diminishing returns to capital or by explaining technical 
change internally, this framework offers an economic 
explanation for sustained productivity and output growth.
Despite these divergent conclusions, the neoclassical and 
new growth frameworks both contribute to our understanding 
of the growth process. Using traditional neoclassical methods, 
for example, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and 
Sichel (2000) show that a combination of accelerating technical 
progress in high-tech industries and the resultant investment in 
information technology (IT) are driving recent productivity 
gains in the United States. This type of neoclassical analysis 
clearly illustrates what happened to the U.S. economy. It 
cannot, however, explain why technical progress accelerated in 
high-tech industries; this is a job left to the new growth 
theorists. In this sense, each theory makes a significant 
contribution to our understanding of productivity growth. The 
sophisticated methodological tools developed by neoclassical 
economists enable us to measure the rate of technical change, 
while the sophisticated models of the new growth theorists 
provide an internal explanation for the sources of technical 
change. In the next section, I compare these alternative views 
and discuss the useful role of each.
One important theme, common to both views, is that 
investment is a fundamental part of the growth process. 
Investment, moreover, may be defined broadly to include any 
expenditure that provides productive payoffs in the future; 
therefore, measures of human capital and research and 
development (R&D) expenditures are now routinely included in 
productivity analyses. Indeed, even the concept of tangible capital 
is not static—the U.S. national accounts now treat software 
expenditures as an investment good since software code is a 
durable asset that contributes to production over several years.
In addition to this broadening of the investment concept, an 
important part of the measurement process is the recognition 
of the enormous heterogeneity of investment. For example, the 
productive impact of investment in information technology 
may be quite different from that of investment in structures. By 
disaggregating investment and accounting for these 
differences, economists can accurately gauge the productive 
impact of input accumulation and thus isolate and gauge the 
extent of technical change. In this article, I outline several 
major conceptual and methodological issues related to 
measuring production inputs and technical progress correctly.
The differences between neoclassical and new growth 
theories also have a direct bearing on several specific topics that 
have recently generated considerable interest. Later in this 
article, I address two relevant issues. In particular, I present a 
resolution to the computer productivity paradox and review 
the renewed embodiment controversy. These topics are 
important in their own right, and they illuminate the ongoing 
debate over the sources of productivity and output growth.
Productivity Growth from the
Neoclassical and New Growth
Perspectives
Economic growth theory has enjoyed a revival in recent years, 
with questions about the sources of productivity growth high on 
the list of scholars, policymakers, and the business press. The 
academic growth literature has bifurcated, however, into 
arguments for two competing views—a neoclassical and a new 
growth view.3 This section presents stylized models from each 
perspective and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Broadly defined investment—which includes expenditures 
on tangible assets, education, training, and other human 
capital accumulation, as well as research and development—
plays a pivotal role in both frameworks, although investment’s 
precise impact on productivity growth differs. Benefits from 
investment may accrue only internally to the economic agent 
that actually makes the investment, or the benefits may spill 
over more broadly to others in the economy. As a preview of 
the discussion, the idea that broadly defined capital generates 
primarily internal and diminishing returns is the hallmark of 
the neoclassical view, differentiating it from the new growth 
theory’s focus on external and constant (or increasing) returns. 
This leads to contrasting views of the investment-productivity 









95-99 90-95 73-90 1959-73
U.S. Labor Productivity Growth, 1959-99
Percent
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Both series refer to annual nonfarm business productivity.
Annual growth rate
6 Annual average growth 
rate for subperiodFRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 39
The World of Neoclassical Growth
The standard neoclassical growth model is well known and will 
be reviewed here only briefly. Seminal papers by Solow (1956, 
1957) formalized the neoclassical model, integrated theory 
with national account data, and formed the basis for much of 
applied growth analysis.
The Basic Neoclassical Model
The link between output,  , and capital services,  , labor 
input,  , and labor-augmenting (Harrod-neutral) technical 
progress,  , is given by the familiar aggregate production 
function
(1) ,
where the neoclassical production function is typically 
assumed to have constant returns to scale, positive and 
diminishing returns with respect to each input, and marginal 
products of each input that approach zero (infinity) as each 
input goes to infinity (zero).
Investment enters through the capital accumulation 
equation, which governs the relationship between investment 
in tangible assets,  , and capital stock,  , via the perpetual 
inventory relationship
(2) ,
where   is depreciation and   can either be determined 
endogenously by profit-maximizing firms or assumed to be 
some fixed proportion of output.
Note that the production function includes a measure of 
capital services,  , while the perpetual inventory equation 
defines the capital stock,  . These two capital concepts are 
closely linked but differ according to compositional changes in 
aggregate investment. In the simplest neoclassical world with 
one investment good, the two concepts are identical, but in a 
world with many heterogeneous types of investment goods, 
they differ. For example, a shift in investment toward high-tech 
equipment with large marginal products leads capital services 
to grow more quickly than capital stock. This important 
distinction is discussed in detail later in this article.
The striking implication of the neoclassical model is that, in 
the long run, per capita output and productivity growth are 
driven entirely by growth in exogenous technical progress and 
they are independent of other structural parameters like the 
savings rate.4 If the savings rate and investment share increase, 
for example, the long-run level of productivity rises but the 
long-run growth rate eventually reflects only technical 




Yt fK t Tt Lt ⋅ , () =
IS




really a model of long-run growth at all since productivity 
growth is due to exogenous and entirely unexplained technical 
progress. Nonetheless, the neoclassical model has proved to be 
a useful tool for understanding the proximate factors that 
contribute to output and productivity growth.5
Solow (1957) provides an explicit methodology for 
measuring the rate of technical progress under the neoclassical 
assumptions of competitive factor markets and input 
exhaustion when technology is Hicks-neutral and output is 
modeled as  . In this case, the rate of Hicks-
neutral technical progress equals the famous Solow residual, or 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth. This is defined as the 
difference between output growth and the share-weighted 
growth rates of primary inputs (capital and labor) as
(3) ,
where   represents a first difference,   is capital’s share of 
national income,   is labor’s share of national income, the 
standard neoclassical assumptions imply  , and 
time subscripts are dropped for ease of exposition.6
Under the same assumptions, one can identify the sources 
of average labor productivity (ALP) growth, defined as output 
per hour worked,  . Transforming equation 3 yields
(4)
,
where lowercase letters are per hour worked.
Growth in ALP,  , depends on three factors. The first is 
capital deepening,  , which captures the increase in capital 
services per hour. The second is the growth in labor quality, 
which measures substitution toward workers with higher 
marginal products and is defined as the difference between the 
growth of labor input and the growth of hours worked 
. The third is the growth in TFP,  , defined 
in equation 3, which captures the impact of technical change 
and other factors that raise output growth beyond the 
measured contribution of inputs.
If the neoclassical assumptions fail to hold, however, the 
Solow residual will not measure only technical change. Other 
factors that affect the Solow residual include distortions from 
imperfect competition, externalities and production spillovers, 
omitted inputs, cyclical fluctuations, nonconstant returns to 
scale, and reallocation effects. If there are increasing returns to 
scale but no technical change, for example, input shares will 
not equal output elasticities and one would estimate a positive 
Solow residual even though there is no technical change. While 
this may confound the interpretation of the Solow residual as a 
pure technology measure, it remains a useful indicator of the 
underlying technological forces. Basu and Fernald (1997), for 
example, report a high correlation between a traditional Solow 
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residual and a more sophisticated index of technology that 
controls for market imperfections. Moreover, they argue that 
the Solow residual is an important welfare measure, even when 
it is not a measure of pure technical change.
Applications of the Neoclassical Model
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) use equations 2-4 in a traditional 
growth accounting analysis to study the sources of U.S. 
economic growth. They conclude that investment in tangible 
assets has been the dominant source of growth over the past 
four decades, while the contribution of technical progress as 
measured by the Solow residual has been relatively modest.
From 1959 to 1998, output grew 3.63 percent per year, 
reflecting 1.59 percent annual growth in hours and 2.04 percent 
growth in labor productivity (Table 1). Labor productivity 
growth reflects the contributions of capital deepening (1.10 
percentage points per year), labor quality (0.32 percentage point 
per year), and TFP growth (0.63 percentage point per year). 
Thus, accumulation of tangible assets and human capital 
(measured as labor quality gains) has been an important part of 
U.S. output and productivity growth over the past four decades.
For the late 1990s, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) find that 
both an acceleration of TFP and rapid capital accumulation 
contributed to the recent U.S. productivity revival. For the 
1995-98 period, estimated TFP growth of 0.99 percent per year 
was nearly three times as fast as it was during the 1973-95 
period. Although the neoclassical model cannot really explain 
why TFP accelerated, it is nonetheless an important result since 
faster technical progress drives long-run productivity growth. 
Indeed, faster TFP growth is now incorporated into the rapid 
medium-run growth projections made by the Congressional 
Budget Office (2000).
Gauging the relative importance of capital deepening and 
technology has also been an important part of the debate 
surrounding the performance of the Asian newly industrialized 
countries (NICs). Krugman (1994), Young (1995), and Collins 
and Bosworth (1996) use this type of traditional neoclassical 
analysis to evaluate the potential for long-run growth in the NICs. 
All three conclude that broadly defined capital accumulation, as 
opposed to exogenous technical progress (measured as TFP 
growth), was the primary engine of growth for the NICs, and thus 
they are pessimistic about future growth prospects. Again, it is the 
neoclassical implication—that only technical change drives long-
run productivity growth—that makes this distinction so 
important. These findings have led to a sharp debate over the 
relative importance of capital accumulation and TFP growth as 
sources of growth in these economies.7
These two applications of neoclassical growth accounting help 
to explain the proximate factors driving growth in the United 
States and in the NICs, although the conclusions must be kept in 
the proper perspective. As stressed by Hulten (1979), this 
methodology yields a valid measure of the rate of technical 
change if neoclassical assumptions hold, but also tends to 
understate the economic importance of it. For example, in a 
simple neoclassical model, faster technical change induces higher 
output, saving, investment, and capital accumulation, so part of 
historical capital accumulation itself is due to technical change in 
a deeper sense. It must be stressed, however, that the goal of 
growth accounting is to quantify the contribution of accumulated 
inputs correctly so that the rate of technical progress can be 
accurately measured. Modern growth accounting is more about 
measuring technical change than explaining it.
Table 1
Sources of U.S. Output and Productivity Growth, 1959-98
1959-98 1959-73 1973-90 1990-95 1995-98
Growth in output (Y) 3.63 4.33 3.13 2.74 4.73
Growth in hours (H) 1.59 1.38 1.69 1.37 2.36
Growth in average labor productivity (Y/H) 2.04 2.95 1.44 1.37 2.37
Contribution of capital deepening 1.10 1.49 0.91 0.64 1.13
Contribution of labor quality 0.32 0.45 0.20 0.37 0.25
Contribution of aggregate total factor productivity 0.63 1.01 0.33 0.36 0.99
Source: Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
Notes: Decomposition of labor productivity growth is based on equation 4 in the text. All values are average annual percentages.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 41
Moving beyond the Neoclassical Model
The appealing simplicity and intuition of the neoclassical 
framework have made it the backbone of applied work on 
productivity and economic growth.8 Despite this popularity, 
however, several shortcomings make the standard neoclassical 
model not entirely satisfactory. First, early studies attributed 
the vast majority of labor productivity growth to exogenous 
forces.9 Then, in the 1970s and 1980s, the neoclassical model 
failed to offer a persuasive explanation for important U.S. 
productivity trends like the post-1973 productivity slowdown. 
Second, since capital accumulation is subject to diminishing 
returns, steady-state growth in per capita variables inevitably 
grinds to a halt without exogenous technical progress. Finally, 
the international data did not seem to fit with the basic 
neoclassical model in terms of observed differences in income, 
capital shares and rates of return, and convergence 
properties.10 These shortcomings led to several lines of 
subsequent research on the relationship between investment 
and productivity growth.
One approach, originated by Jorgenson and Griliches 
(1967) and summarized in Jorgenson (1996), remained firmly 
embedded in the neoclassical tradition and sought to develop 
better measures of investment, capital, labor, and other 
omitted inputs in order to reduce the magnitude of the 
unexplained residual. This approach did not seek to explain the 
origins of technical progress but rather to reduce its 
importance as an empirical explanation of growth. I return to 
the details of this work later. The second direction was the 
endogenous growth literature, to which I now turn.
The World of Endogenous Growth
The endogenous or new growth theory was developed to move 
beyond the neoclassical model by providing an endogenous 
mechanism for long-run productivity growth, either by 
removing the diminishing returns to capital or by explaining 
technical change as the result of specific actions. This literature 
is quite varied, and alternative explanations focus on many 
factors like different production structures, the dynamics of 
competition, innovation, increasing returns, and production 
spillovers. The following discussion describes a representative 
endogenous growth model.11
A Simple Endogenous Growth Model
A primary motivation for developing endogenous growth 
models was the desire to avoid the neoclassical implication 
that only exogenous technical progress drives long-run 
productivity growth. Indeed, one can simply assume a constant 
marginal product of capital as in the so-called “AK” models in 
which output is a linear function of capital,  .12 In this 
case, long-run productivity growth can continue, and any 
change in the level of technology or savings rate leads to a long-
run change in productivity growth.
Romer (1986), in a classic paper that sparked the new 
growth theory, provided a mechanism and corresponding 
economic explanation for why capital might not suffer from 
diminishing returns. In particular, Romer focused on the 
possibility of external effects as research and development 
efforts by one firm spill over and affect the stock of knowledge 
available to all firms. Firms face constant returns to scale to all 
yt Akt =
private inputs, but the level of technology,  , varies, depending 
on the aggregate stock of some privately provided input
(5) ,
where an   subscript represents firm-specific variables,   is 
the aggregate stock of knowledge, and time subscripts are 
dropped.13
The exact nature of the spillover is not particularly 
important for the aggregate properties of the model, and 
economists have identified several alternative channels. For 
instance, Arrow (1962) emphasizes “learning-by-doing,” in 
which investment in tangible assets generates spillovers as 
aggregate capital increases; past gross investment proxies for 
experience and determines A(.).14 Alternatively, Romer (1986) 
essentially models A(.) as a function of the stock of R&D, Lucas 
(1988) models A(.) as dependent on the stock of human 
capital, and Coe and Helpman (1995) argue that A(.) also 
depends on the R&D stock of international trading partners. 
The key point is that there may be constant (or increasing) 
A
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A primary motivation for developing
endogenous growth models was
the desire to avoid the neoclassical 
implication that only exogenous technical 
progress drives long-run productivity 
growth.42 What Drives Productivity Growth?
returns to accumulated inputs at the aggregate level, and thus 
the generation of long-run endogenous growth.15
The existence of production spillovers raises a significant 
empirical question that has generated a vast literature. If 
investment of any type—tangible assets, human capital, or 
R&D—generates benefits to the economy that are not 
internalized by private agents, then this suggests that there are 
multiple long-run growth paths and that there are specific policy 
implications. Since investment may be too low from society’s 
point of view, spillovers open a role for government intervention 
such as investment tax credits or research and development 
grants. R&D spillovers, in particular, have attracted considerable 
attention in the new growth literature, and I review the 
microeconomic evidence on them later.
Macro Evidence of Endogenous Growth
One aggregate implication of early endogenous growth models 
is a “scale effect,” in which productivity growth increases with 
the size of the economy. Larger economies devote more 
resources to R&D and knowledge production is available to all, 
so technology should grow more rapidly. In addition, this 
suggests that government policy, in the form of taxes or 
subsidies that increase resources allocated to knowledge 
production or investment, can raise long-run growth.
In a pair of influential studies, however, Jones (1995a, 
1995b) strongly rejects this scale effect and finds little 
relationship between policy variables and long-run growth. 
There is no obvious relationship between the number of 
scientists and engineers employed in R&D activities and U.S. 
TFP growth (Jones 1995a), nor has there been persistent 
acceleration in growth in countries belonging to the  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
even as investment shares rose dramatically (Jones 1995b). 
Over a very long horizon, however, the evidence of a scale effect 
is somewhat stronger; Kremer (1993) argues that productivity 
and population growth are highly correlated with initial 
population levels, as scale effects imply.
This influential critique has led to several alternatives to 
remove the link between scale and growth found in 
endogenous growth models.16 Jones (1995a), for example, 
presents a model of “semi-endogenous” growth, in which long-
run growth still reflects firms’ R&D choices, but is independent 
of government policies such as investment tax credits or R&D 
subsidies. Scale or policy variables affect the levels of output 
and productivity but not long-run growth rates. The key factor 
determining long-run growth in this semi-endogenous growth 
model remains the degree of external returns in the R&D 
process, which delivers endogenous growth and provides the 
critical distinction from the neoclassical model.
In more recent work at the macro level, Jones and Williams 
(1998) formalize the macroeconomic impact of increasing 
overall returns due to various external effects related to R&D. 
They calibrate their model and estimate that optimal 
investment in R&D is two to four times actual investment in 
the United States. This work suggests an important role for 
R&D but remains consistent with the empirical refutation of 
the macro R&D models in Jones (1995a, 1995b).
Expanding the Investment Definition
I now turn to several broad measurement issues that directly 
affect how these types of models are implemented and 
evaluated. Over the years, sophisticated tools have been 
developed to measure inputs properly, and the definition of 
investment has been expanded beyond tangible assets. By 
quantifying substitution between heterogeneous tangible assets 
and explicitly recognizing investment in human capital, 
research and development, and public infrastructure, 
economists have made considerable methodological advances 
in the understanding of productivity growth. These 
improvements are now well-accepted and are part of the 
toolkits of most applied productivity analysts; for example, the 
official U.S. TFP estimates of the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2000a) account for asset substitution, human capital, and 
R&D.
These advances are also relevant to the debate between the 
neoclassical and new growth views. From the neoclassical view, 
improved measurement of inputs allows technical progress to 
be more accurately assessed. From the new growth view, 
constant returns may be more realistic for broader definitions 
of capital. The degree of economy-wide returns to accumulated 
inputs—diminishing returns in the neoclassical world and 
constant (or increasing) returns in the new growth world—
remains the fundamental difference between the two views of 
economic growth, and this is conceptually independent of how 
broadly capital is defined or measured. Simply including 
additional inputs like human capital or R&D capital is not 
enough to generate endogenous growth if broadly defined 
capital still faces diminishing returns.
Finally, many of these methodological advances have been 
implemented within neoclassical growth accounting analyses. 
As mentioned above, the primary goal of these studies is to 
develop better measures of inputs and a more accurate estimate 
of technical progress. It is not, as is often assumed, to show that FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 43
there is no technical progress. Careful growth accounting 
analyses purge the transitory impact of investment and input 
accumulation to leave behind a more precise estimate of the 
growth rate of technical progress.
Heterogeneous Tangible Assets
An important insight, first implemented by Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967), is that one must account for the vast 
heterogeneity of capital inputs. A dollar spent on new 
computer equipment, for example, provides more productive 
services per period than a dollar spent on a new building. By 
explicitly recognizing these types of differences, one can 
estimate a “capital service flow” that is appropriate for the 
production function in equation 1.
Aggregate capital service flows are estimated by using asset-
specific “user costs” or “rental prices” to weight each 
heterogeneous asset and to account for substitution between 
them. As firms respond to changing relative prices—for 
example, by substituting toward high-tech equipment and 
away from structures—a larger portion of investment is in 
assets with relatively high marginal products, and the capital 
service flow rises.17 The difference between capital service flows 
and capital stock is called “capital quality” by some authors and 
reflects the changing composition of investment toward assets 
with higher marginal products.18
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) provide estimates of this 
decomposition between capital stock and capital quality. As 
shown in Table 2, capital stock accumulation has been the 
dominant force behind the growth in capital services in the 
United States, accounting for 1.32 of the 1.77 percentage 
point growth contribution of capital for the 1959-98 period. 
For the most recent period, the contribution of capital 
quality has increased markedly as firms steadily responded 
to changing relative prices and substituted toward high-tech 
equipment. Gordon (1999a) examines a longer time period, 
dating back to 1870, and concludes that quality adjustments 
of capital and labor inputs have been important sources of 
long-run growth in the United States.
The evidence shows that one must use a capital services 
methodology to quantify the role of capital accumulation 
correctly and to isolate technical progress. Failure to account 
for ongoing substitution understates the contribution of input 
accumulation and overstates the TFP residual from equation 3. 
Thus, this type of careful measurement of capital services is 
critical to obtaining accurate measures of technical progress 
and understanding long-run growth.
Human Capital
A second important extension of the capital concept is the 
explicit inclusion of the contribution of changes in labor 
quality. Economists have long recognized the importance of 
investments in human beings; and expenditures on education, 
job training, labor migration, and health care all increase the 
quality of human labor, enhance productivity, and are rightly 
called investments.19
Griliches (1960), Denison (1962), and Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967) pioneered the use of wage data to weight 
heterogeneous workers and construct constant-quality indexes 
Table 2
Growth Contribution of Capital and Labor Inputs, 1959-98
1959-98 1959-73 1973-90 1990-95 1995-98
Contribution of capital services (K) 1.77 2.07 1.62 1.20 2.17
Contribution of capital stock 1.32 1.66 1.22 0.77 1.23
Contribution of capital quality 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.95
Contribution of labor input (L) 1.23 1.25 1.17 1.18 1.57
Contribution of labor hours 0.92 0.80 0.97 0.81 1.32
Contribution of labor quality 0.32 0.45 0.20 0.37 0.25
Source: Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
Notes: Growth contribution of capital quality equals the difference between the contribution of capital services and capital stock. Growth contribution of 
labor quality equals the difference between the contribution of labor input and labor hours. See the text for details. All values are average annual percentages.44 What Drives Productivity Growth?
of  labor input. Similar to the treatment of capital, this 
approach captures substitution between different types of labor 
and results in a flow of labor inputs appropriate for the 
production function analysis of equation 1. In contrast, a 
simple sum of hours worked by heterogeneous workers ignores 
this type of compositional change.20
Using the framework in equations 3 and 4 and again defining 
labor quality as the difference in the growth of labor input and 
unweighted hours, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) estimate that 
labor quality growth accounted for nearly 15 percent of labor 
productivity growth for the 1959-98 period (Tables 1 and 2). 
Similarly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999b) attributes one-
third of  U.S. nonfarm labor productivity growth from 1990 to 
1997 to labor composition effects. Again, failure to account for 
these quality changes overstates historical TFP growth.
Looking at the impact of human capital from a different 
perspective, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) include 
investment in human capital in an augmented Solow growth 
model to examine cross-country differences in growth. 
Employing a Cobb-Douglas specification for aggregate 
output, they explicitly model human capital as a 
determinant of output as
(6) ,
where   is the stock of human capital.21
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) use educational 
attainment to proxy for human capital accumulation. They 
find that this extended neoclassical model fits the data well in 
terms of the growth convergence predictions and the estimated 
output elasticities. The authors conclude that the augmented 
Solow model in its neoclassical form is consistent with the 
international evidence. In contrast, Lucas (1988) incorporates 
human capital in a growth model but explicitly includes an 
external spillover effect in the spirit of new growth theory.
Although these studies differ in their approach and 
questions—Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) show labor quality to 
be an important contributor to U.S. productivity growth, and 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) find human capital to be a 
good predictor of cross-country income differences—both 
emphasize the importance of accounting for human capital 
accumulation. By correctly identifying and measuring 
accumulated inputs, this extension of the neoclassical model 
allows for a better understanding of the growth process.
Research and Development
Knowledge creation through explicit research and 
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accumulation process that deserves special attention. R&D, 
broadly defined as investment in new knowledge that improves 
the production process, has been the focus of considerable 
research activity. There is still some debate, however, over 
whether R&D is best viewed as a neoclassical factor of 
production or if it is best viewed as a source of spillovers as in 
the endogenous growth models.
It is straightforward to think of R&D as just another form of 
capital in which firms choose to invest. In this sense, R&D is 
not fundamentally different from investment in tangible 
capital. Griliches (1973, 1979), for example, argues that it is 
reasonable to view the primary impact of R&D investment in a 
neoclassical sense since returns accrue internally. Firms 
presumably invest in R&D to improve their own production 
processes and to raise profits, so any spillover effects are 
secondary and unintended consequences.
While it is conceptually straightforward to treat R&D as a 
neoclassical factor of production with diminishing returns, 
Griliches (1995), Hall (1996), and Jorgenson (1996) all 
emphasize the practical difficulty in measuring the growth 
contribution of R&D because of thorny measurement 
problems and a lack of adequate data. Hall (1996) points out 
that R&D is often associated with product improvements, and 
the measured impact of R&D therefore depends critically on 
how price deflators are constructed and how output is deflated. 
In addition, one must estimate an appropriate depreciation 
rate to calculate the productive stock of R&D capital.
Despite these problems, many studies have attempted to 
measure the direct impact of R&D.22 As an example of the 
typical approach, Griliches (1995) presents a skeletal model of 
R&D that is a straightforward extension of the neoclassical 
framework:
(7) ,
where   is a vector of standard inputs, such as capital and 
labor, and   is a measure of cumulative research effort.
Studies of this type typically have found that R&D capital 
contributes significantly to cross-sectional variation in 
productivity. It is important to emphasize that equation 7 
examines the relationship between firm or industry productivity 
and its own R&D stock. In the equation, R&D is treated as a 
conventional neoclassical capital input with internal rewards.
Others, however, argue that R&D capital is fundamentally 
different from tangible and human capital. Knowledge capital 
appears to be noncompetitive since many producers can use 
the same idea simultaneously, and the returns may be hard to 
appropriate due to potential production spillovers. This 
difference is what makes R&D capital an important part of the 
endogenous growth models discussed earlier.23 As emphasized 
by Romer (1994) and Basu (1996), the distinction between 
Y ln a t () β X ln γ R ln ε +++ =
X
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internal and external benefits drives the difference in returns to 
capital that delineates the role of research and development in 
the neoclassical and the new growth theories.
There seems to be some confusion, however, about what 
constitutes a true production spillover and what is really a 
more conventional measurement problem. Griliches (1995, 
p. 66) defines a production (knowledge) spillover as “ideas 
borrowed by research teams of industry   from the research 
results of industry  .” This is quite distinct from situations in 
which transaction prices do not fully reflect the marginal 
benefit of the innovation (for example, see Bresnahan [1986], 
Bartelsman, Caballero, and Lyons [1994], and Keller [1998]). 
Similarly, Hall (1996) discusses how competition may lead to 
lower prices for goods of innovative firms. Rather than 
measuring spillovers in Griliches’ sense, these gains to 
innovation reflect the inaccuracy of prices that do not 
adequately capture changes in the quality dimension.24 While 
there are daunting practical difficulties, if all attributes and 
i
j
quality characteristics could be correctly priced, then increased 
quality or variety of intermediate inputs would not be 
measured as productivity spillovers.
If true productivity gains do spill over to other firms, 
however, one channel for endogenous growth is opened. The 
microeconomic evidence suggests that R&D spillovers may 
exist,25 but a wide variation in results and conceptual 
difficulties suggest that some caution is warranted. Griliches 
(1995), for example, points out that the impact of R&D in 
industry analyses is not greater than in firm analyses (as the 
presence of spillovers implies) and warns, “in spite of a number 
of serious and promising attempts to do so, it has proven very 
difficult to estimate the indirect contribution of R&D via 
spillovers to other firms, industries and countries” (p. 83). 
Given the poor quality of the data and methodological 
problems discussed earlier, it is difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions from these studies.
Public Infrastructure
A final extension of the investment concept worth noting is 
public infrastructure investment. In a series of influential and 
controversial studies, Aschauer (1989a, 1989b, 1990) argues that 
core infrastructure investment is an important source of 
productivity growth and that the sluggish productivity 
performance of the 1970s can be largely attributed to a slowdown 
in public investment. These claims led to a wide-ranging debate 
about policy implications and possible methodological problems 
such as potential biases from common trends, omitted variables, 
and potential reverse causality.26
Independent of any methodological concerns, the primary 
impact of government capital is conceptually the same as that 
of tangible capital and depends on proper measurement.27 In a 
standard neoclassical growth accounting framework with only 
private inputs, any impact from government capital would be 
mismeasured as TFP growth. In this sense, government capital 
is just another accumulated input that is often missed and thus 
contributes to an overstatement of true technical change. As 
long as diminishing returns to all capital exist, the neoclassical 
implications hold.
Alternatively, Barro (1990) suggests that government 
services generate constant returns to broadly defined capital 
and lead to endogenous growth. In this view, government 
capital differs from private capital, and the real question is 
whether long-run constant returns to scale exist across broadly 
defined capital.28
The recent results of Fernald (1999) shed some light on this 
question. He shows that investment in roads contributed 
substantially to productivity prior to 1973, but he also suggests 
that new investment in roads offers a normal or even zero 
return at the margin. That is, the original interstate highway 
system improved productivity, but a second one would not. 
While not an exact test, this seems more consistent with the 
neoclassical view of diminishing returns of capital than with 
the endogenous growth view.
Recent Productivity Controversies
I now move to a discussion of two current and important 
issues relating to investment, productivity, and growth. 
Both are concerned with understanding the sources of 
productivity growth and draw on the neoclassical and 
endogenous growth theories described above. In particular, I 
offer a resolution to the computer productivity paradox and 
review the renewed embodiment controversy.
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The Computer Productivity Paradox
Over the past few decades, investment in high-tech equipment, 
particularly computers, exploded, but aggregate productivity 
growth remained sluggish through the mid-1990s. This 
apparent contradiction—the so-called computer productivity 
paradox of the 1980s and early 1990s—disappointed many 
observers and initiated a broad research effort at both the 
macro and micro levels. More recently, however, productivity 
growth has accelerated sharply (see chart); I argue that this 
pattern is entirely consistent with neoclassical explanations of 
capital accumulation and technical progress.29
The defining characteristic of the information technology 
revolution is the enormous improvement in the quality of 
computers, peripherals, software, and communications 
equipment. As epitomized by Moore’s Law—the doubling of 
the power of a computer chip every eighteen months—each 
generation of new computers easily outperforms models 
considered state-of-the-art just a few years earlier. The constant-
quality deflators employed by the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis translate these massive quality improvements into 
increased real investment and real output and show annual price 
declines of 18 percent over the past four decades.30
How does this IT phenomenon fit within the neoclassical 
framework? To address this question, it is critical to distinguish 
between the use and the production of IT.31 Information 
technology is both an output from the IT-producing industries 
and an input to the IT-using industries, so there are two effects. 
The massive quality improvements in IT contribute to faster 
productivity growth in the IT-producing industries and faster 
input accumulation in the IT-using industries. Thus, the 
neoclassical model predicts rapid capital deepening and ALP 
growth in IT-using industries, and technical progress and TFP 
growth in the IT-producing industries. This fundamental 
distinction is apparent in Solow (1957), but often has been 
overlooked in discussions of the computer productivity paradox.
IT Use, Capital Deepening, and Productivity 
Growth
Consider the productivity of firms and industries that invest in 
and use information technology. Following the neoclassical 
framework in equation 4, strong IT investment contributes 
directly to ALP growth through traditional capital deepening 
effects. In the case of IT, this reflects rapid growth in capital 
services and, until recently, a small income share. Over the past 
four decades, however, U.S. firms have continued to respond to 
large price declines by investing heavily, particularly in 
computer hardware, and rapidly accumulating IT.
As long as relative prices continued to fall, it was inevitable 
that IT inputs would eventually make a large contribution to 
growth. Indeed, recent estimates by Jorgenson and Stiroh 
(2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000), and Whelan (2000) indicate 
substantial increases in the growth contributions from 
computers and other IT capital. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), 
as reported in Table 3, estimate that the contribution of 
computer hardware increased from 0.19 percentage point 
per year for the 1990-95 period to 0.46 percentage point for 
1995-98; Oliner and Sichel (2000) report an increase from 
0.25 for 1990-95 to 0.63 for 1996-99.32 Both agree that IT 
capital accumulation has been an important part of the 
acceleration in U.S. productivity since 1995.
Table 3
Growth Contribution of Information Technology and Other Assets, 1959-98
1959-98 1959-73 1973-90 1990-95 1995-98
Contribution of capital services (K) 1.77 2.07 1.62 1.20 2.17
Other capital 1.45 1.89 1.27 0.80 1.42
Computer hardware 0.18 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.46
Computer software 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.19
Communications equipment 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.10
Source: Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
Notes: A growth contribution is defined as the share-weighted real growth rate of the asset as in equation 3 in the text. All values are average annual 
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This historical record on IT capital accumulation appears 
entirely consistent with the neoclassical model. Massive input 
substitution and rapid capital accumulation during the 1990s 
have led to an aggregate growth contribution that is now quite 
large. Prior to that, the contribution was modest because the 
stock of IT was small. Only in the late 1990s, after a major 
information technology investment boom, were there enough 
information technology inputs to have a substantial impact on 
growth and labor productivity at the aggregate level.
Despite the straightforward relationship and mounting 
aggregate evidence, the empirical evidence on computers 
and ALP growth across industries has been mixed. Gera, Gu, 
and Lee (1999), McGuckin, Steitwieser, and Doms (1998), 
McGuckin and Stiroh (1998), and Steindel (1992) find a 
positive impact, while Berndt and Morrison (1995) report a 
negative impact. Morrison (1997) finds overinvestment in 
high-tech assets for much of the 1980s. The microeconomic 
evidence for firms is somewhat stronger. For example, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993, 1995, 1996), Lehr and  
Lichtenberg (1999), and Lichtenberg (1995) typically 
estimate returns to computers that exceed other forms of 
capital.
On the surface, exceptionally high returns to IT suggest 
effects found in some endogenous growth models. The 
findings of large gross returns, however, are also quite 
consistent with the neoclassical model—computers must 
have high marginal products because they obsolesce and 
lose value so rapidly. Computers have a low acquisition 
price, but rapid obsolescence makes them expensive to use 
and a high return is needed as compensation. This is exactly 
the type of asset heterogeneity for which the user-cost 
methodology was designed. In addition, Brynjolfsson and 
Yang (1997) suggest that much of the “excess returns” to 
computers actually represent returns to previously 
unspecified inputs such as software investment, training, 
and organizational change that accompany computer 
investment.
Note that the neoclassical framework predicts no TFP 
growth from IT use since all output contributions are due to 
capital accumulation. Computers increase measured TFP 
only if there are nontraditional effects like increasing 
returns, production spillovers, or network externalities, or if 
inputs are measured incorrectly. The nontraditional effects, 
if present, would move the IT revolution into the world of 
new growth theory. The evidence, however, is not very 
strong. Siegel and Griliches (1992) and Siegel (1997) 
estimate a positive impact of computer investment on TFP 
growth across U.S. industries, while Berndt and Morrison 
(1995) and Stiroh (1998a) do not. Working with aggregate 
data, Gordon (2000) finds no evidence of computer-related 
spillovers in the late 1990s. In sum, there does not appear to 
be compelling evidence for nontraditional effects from IT 
that lead outside of the neoclassical model.
IT Production and Technical Progress
Now consider the productivity of firms and industries that 
produce IT assets. These sectors are experiencing fundamental 
technical progress—the ability to produce more output in the 
form of faster processors, expanded storage capacity, and 
increased capabilities from the same inputs—that should be 
measured directly as industry TFP and lead to higher ALP 
growth (equations 3 and 4). This affects both industry and 
aggregate productivity.
The data are quite clear that fundamental technical 
progress, measured as TFP growth, is a driving force in the 
production of these new high-tech assets. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (1999b), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner and 
Sichel (2000), and Stiroh (1998a) all report strong industry 
TFP growth in the high-tech producing industries. Moreover, 
much of the acceleration in aggregate U.S. productivity growth 
after 1995 can be traced to accelerations in the pace of technical 
progress—measured as faster relative price declines in these 
high-tech industries.33
This notion that technical progress in specific industries 
drives aggregate productivity is hardly new and is consistent 
with the broad neoclassical framework. As early as Domar 
(1961), economists recognized that aggregate TFP growth 
reflects technical progress among component industries. 
Accelerating technical progress in key industries can then drive 
aggregate productivity through both a direct TFP contribution 
and induced capital accumulation as relative prices change.
Only in the late 1990s, after a major 
information technology investment boom, 
were there enough information 
technology inputs to have a substantial 
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Alternative Explanations
The preceding discussion still leaves open the question of why 
even ALP growth remains sluggish in some computer-intensive 
sectors like finance, insurance, real estate, and services. Since 
computers are highly concentrated in service sectors, where 
output and productivity are notoriously hard to measure, 
Diewert and Fox (1999), Griliches (1994), Maclean (1997), and 
McGuckin and Stiroh (1998) suggest that measurement error 
plays a role in the remaining computer productivity paradox 
for certain IT-using industries.
A second common explanation is that computers are still 
relatively new and it may just be a matter of time until they 
fundamentally change the production process and usher in a 
period of faster productivity growth throughout the economy. 
David (1989, 1990) draws a parallel between the slow 
productivity benefits from electricity and those from 
computers. Triplett (1999a), however, cautions against such 
analogies, arguing convincingly that the massive declines in 
computer prices, and hence the diffusion patterns, are 
unprecedented. Moreover, computers are no longer really a 
new investment—the first commercial purchase of a UNIVAC 
mainframe computer was in 1954, and computer investment 
has been a separate entity in the U.S. national accounts since 
1958.34 This critical mass and delay hypothesis is beginning to 
lose credibility as an explanation for low productivity in certain 
computer-intensive industries.
A final explanation is simply that computers are not that 
productive in some industries. Anecdotes abound of failed 
systems, lengthy periods of downtime, unwanted and 
unnecessary “features,” and time-consuming upgrades—
all of which can reduce the productivity of computer 
investment.35 
IT and the New Economy
Despite some lingering questions, the computer productivity 
paradox appears to be over. Aggregate productivity growth is 
strong, and IT-producing industries are showing rapid TFP 
growth. Moreover, the IT revolution and the “new economy” 
appear to be largely a neoclassical story of relative price declines 
and input substitution. Technical change in the production of 
information technology assets lowers the relative price, induces 
massive high-tech investment, and is ultimately responsible for 
the recent productivity revival.
These benefits, however, accrue primarily to the producers 
and users of IT, with little evidence of large spillovers from 
computers. That is, we see TFP growth in IT-producing 
industries and capital deepening elsewhere. Of course, the 
neoclassical model provides no explanation for why technical 
progress may have accelerated in high-tech industries in recent 
years. Perhaps models of endogenous innovation and 
competition can provide an answer.
The Renewed Embodiment Controversy
The discussion so far has focused on the modern neoclassical 
framework and new growth models as explanations of 
productivity growth. An alternative perspective, however, argues 
that technological progress is “embodied” in new machinery and 
equipment, as opposed to being a more pervasive force that 
affects the production of all goods and services. In challenging 
papers, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and 
Hercowitz (1998) recently brought this debate back to center 
stage and reopened the embodiment controversy.
This debate is important since it helps us to understand the 
precise roles of technology and investment in the growth 
process. By better understanding these issues, such as whether 
technology is driving the recent investment boom, one may be 
able to implement more effective policies. Moreover, there are 
clear implications associated with how real aggregate output 
should be measured that directly affect how the economy is 
viewed. For example, Greenwood et al. (1997) disagree with the 
current practice of adjusting the output of investment goods, 
such as computers, for quality improvements. As noted in the 
previous section, gains in the production of computers have 
been a major part of the productivity revival of the 1990s and 
excluding them would substantially change our perception of 
the U.S. economy.
The embodiment idea goes back at least to Solow (1960), who 
suggests that technical change is embodied in new investment 
goods, which are needed to realize the benefits of technical 
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progress. In response, Jorgenson (1966) shows this to be no 
different conceptually from the neoclassical view of  disembodied 
technical change with the calculation of investment price deflators 
responsible for apparent differences. If new vintages of capital have 
different productive characteristics, the appropriate constant-
quality deflators attribute output and productivity growth to input 
accumulation and not to technical progress. Hulten (1992) 
shows how failure to account for improved characteristics of 
recent vintages of investment goods suppresses capital 
enhancements into the traditional TFP residual.
There seems to be general agreement that different vintages of 
capital inputs need to be adjusted for quality change in order to 
understand and quantify the sources of growth. A second 
conclusion of Jorgenson (1966), however, is that investment as an 
output must also be measured in quality-adjusted units; Hulten 
(2000) discusses potential measurement errors when investment is 
not measured in such units. While this methodology has been 
integrated into the U.S. national accounts—where constant-
quality deflators are used for investment goods like computer 
hardware and software to calculate real GDP—it plays a central 
role in the renewed embodiment debate.
Greenwood et al. (1997) and Hercowitz (1998) argue 
explicitly against adjusting investment output for quality 
change, preferring to measure real investment output in units 
of consumption. As motivating evidence, Greenwood et al. 
report that the relative price of equipment in the United States 
has fallen 3 percent per year in the postwar era, while the 
equipment-to-GDP ratio increased dramatically. They 
calibrate a balanced growth path and attribute 60 percent of 
postwar productivity growth to “investment-specific 
technological change” that is conceptually distinct from capital 
accumulation and disembodied (Hicks-neutral) technological 
change. A clear implication, they argue, is that constant-quality 
price indexes are appropriate only for deflating investment 
inputs, not for deflating investment as an output.36
It is essential, in my view, that both investment outputs and 
capital inputs be measured consistently in quality-adjusted 
units, as currently employed in the U.S. national accounts. The 
key point is that improved production characteristics of new 
investment cohorts are themselves produced and rightly 
considered output. Although a rigorous theoretical model is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is useful to sketch out a 
defense of this position.
Consider a simple two-sector, neoclassical model like the 
one outlined in the earlier discussion of the computer 
productivity paradox. One sector produces computers and one 
sector uses computers; both use neoclassical production 
functions. Can this explain the motivating evidence cited by 
Greenwood et al.? The answer is clearly yes. Disembodied 
technical change in the computer-producing industry 
(measured as industry-level TFP) reduces the marginal cost of 
producing computers and lowers prices. Profit-maximizing 
firms elsewhere in the economy respond to the relative price 
change, substitute between inputs, and rapidly accumulate 
computers. Thus, one would observe falling relative prices and 
rising investment shares in a traditional neoclassical world with 
purely disembodied technical change in one sector.
Greenwood et al. appear to need investment-specific technical 
change since they focus on a one-sector model in which 
consumption, equipment investment, and construction 
equipment are produced from the same aggregate production 
function. This effectively imposes perfect substitutability between 
investment and consumption goods and requires investment-
specific technical change to explain relative price changes. In a 
multisector neoclassical model like the one proposed by Domar 
(1961) and implemented by Jorgenson et al. (1987), investment-
specific technical change is not needed since disembodied 
technical progress can proceed at different rates in different 
industries and generate the observed relative price changes.37
What does this say about the appropriate deflation of 
investment goods? In this example, the answer clearly depends on 
what one believes the computer-producing sector actually 
produces. High-tech industries expend considerable resources in 
the form of investment, R&D, and labor to produce better, faster, 
and more powerful products. Indeed, the hedonic literature on 
computers is based on the idea that the computer-producing 
industry creates computing power measured as a bundle of 
productive characteristics, rather than as computer boxes or 
units.38 If computing power measured in quality-adjusted 
efficiency units is the appropriate measure of industry output, and 
I believe it is, then internal accounting consistency requires that 
aggregate output also be measured in quality-adjusted units.
Finally, and perhaps more fundamentally, the neoclassical 
model at its most basic level is a model of production and not 
of welfare. This too implies that output must be a measure of 
produced characteristics in terms of quality-adjusted units, 
rather than consumption forgone. The embodiment approach, 
in contrast, confounds the link between the sources of growth 
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(labor, capital, and technology) and the uses of growth 
(consumption and investment goods) that constitute 
separate views of production and welfare.
Conclusion
This article provides a broad overview of the link between 
investment and productivity in two alternative views—the 
neoclassical and new growth models. Although the models 
emphasize different aspects of productivity growth, they both 
contribute to our understanding of the growth process.
The key distinction between the neoclassical and new growth 
theories concerns the aggregate returns to capital and the 
implications for long-run productivity growth. In the 
neoclassical world, capital (broadly defined to include all 
accumulated inputs) suffers from diminishing returns, and 
productivity growth is ultimately determined by exogenous 
technical progress. In the world of endogenous growth, there 
can be constant returns to capital that generate long-run 
growth in per capita variables. Although both views attempt to 
explain growth, they focus on different aspects and need not be 
mutually exclusive. Neoclassical economists developed 
sophisticated measurement tools to identify technical progress 
accurately by removing the transitory impact of input 
accumulation; new growth theorists developed sophisticated 
growth models to explain the evolution of technology as a result 
of the actions of economic agents. Both contributions are 
important.
Attempts to understand recent changes in the U.S. economy 
illustrate this complementarity. Aggregate productivity growth 
has accelerated in the past few years due to a combination of 
accelerating technical progress in high-tech industries and 
corresponding investment and capital deepening. This type of 
neoclassical analysis clearly explains what happened to the U.S. 
economy. To explain why it happened, we need to focus on the 
incentives and actions of the firms that actually invest, 
innovate, and create the new capital and knowledge that are 
driving the U.S. economy. This is the domain of the 
endogenous growth framework. Thus, both approaches make 
important contributions to our understanding of the economic 
growth process.Endnotes
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1. Labor productivity is defined as real output per hour worked. These 
estimates are for the U.S. nonfarm business sector from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2000b) and are consistent with the revised GDP data 
after the benchmark revision in October 1999.
2. See, for example, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Oliner and Sichel 
(2000), Gordon (1999b, 2000), and Parry (2000).
3. See Jorgenson (1996) for a discussion of the growth theory revival, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a thorough analysis of the 
neoclassical framework, and Aghion and Howitt (1998) for a detailed 
review of different strands of new growth theory. The terms “new 
growth” and “endogenous growth” are used interchangeably 
throughout this article. 
4. The Solow model assumes labor is fully employed so per capita 
income and labor productivity growth coincide.
5. The neoclassical model has also been used extensively to examine 
cross-country differences in the growth and level of output. This vast 
body of literature is not discussed here; see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) for references and Mankiw (1995) for a summary of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the neoclassical model in this context.
6. Under the neoclassical assumptions, an input’s elasticity equals its 
share of nominal output since the marginal product of an input equals 
its factor price, for example, the wage rate for labor and the rental price 
for capital.
7. Hsieh (1997, 1999), Rodrick (1997), and Young (1998b) provide 
recent views on this controversy.
8. Stiroh (1998b) reports that the long-run projection models used by 
various U.S. government agencies—for example, the Social Security 
Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of 
Management and Budget, and the General Accounting Office—are all 
firmly embedded in this neoclassical tradition.
9. Solow (1957), for example, estimates that nearly 90 percent of 
per capita income growth is due to technical progress. 
10. See Mankiw (1995), particularly pp. 280-9.
11. My working definition follows Segerstrom (1998), who defines 
endogenous growth models as those in which “the rates of 
technological change and economic growth are endogenously 
determined based on the optimizing behavior of firms and 
consumers” (p. 1292). Hulten (2000) identifies noncompetitive 
markets, increasing returns to scale, externalities, and endogenous 
innovation as the key aspects of the new growth theory.
12. Technically, long-run growth in per capita variables exists under 
constant returns to all accumulated inputs. Note that in the simplest  
AK model like this one,   represents a constant level of technology, in 
contrast to the general production functions in the text. 
13. These simplifications follow Romer (1994), who summarizes the 
evolution of endogenous growth models. One alternative mechanism 
is to allow for increasing returns at the level of individual firms. 
However, this approach is inconsistent with perfect competition. See 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) for a discussion. In addition, there are 
aggregation concerns when moving from a firm to an aggregate 
production function.
14. Note that Arrow (1962) does not explicitly derive a model of 
endogenous growth. In his model, growth eventually stops if 
population is held constant.
15. Barro (1990) achieves endogenous growth in a model with 
constant returns to capital and government services together, but 
diminishing returns to private capital alone. DeLong and Summers 
(1991, 1992, 1993), although not modeling endogenous growth, argue 
that equipment investment yields large external benefits in the spirit of 
Arrow (1962).
16. See, for example, Jones (1995a), Kortum (1997), Segerstrom 
(1998), and Young (1998a). Jones (1999) reviews.
17.An asset’s rental price reflects the opportunity cost of buying 
the asset, depreciation, and any capital gains or losses on the asset. 
High-tech equipment experiences more rapid depreciation and 
smaller capital gains than structures, so equipment must have a 
correspondingly higher marginal product and service price. See Hall 
and Jorgenson (1967) for the original derivation and Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (2000) for a recent application and details.
18. Note that capital quality in this framework does not reflect 
increased productive power from a particular asset. These gains, such 
as the enhanced performance of more recent vintages of computers, 
are handled by the investment deflator, which translates nominal 
investment into larger quantities of real investment. I provide details 
later in this article.
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Endnotes (Continued)
19. Mincer (1958, 1974), Shultz (1961), and Becker (1962) are early 
examples; Griliches (1996) provides a summary of the early work on 
human capital. As early as 1961, the similarities between investments in 
tangible capital and human capital such as tax incentives, depreciation, 
pricing imperfections, and the primarily internal benefits of human 
capital investments were discussed by Schultz (1961, pp. 13-5).
20. This methodology provides an index of aggregate human capital 
that changes as the composition of the labor force changes. The key 
assumption is that the quality of a particular type of labor—for 
example, a person of a given age, education, experience—is constant 
over time. Ho and Jorgenson (1999) provide methodological details.
21. Note that Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) explicitly assume 
there are diminishing returns to accumulated inputs,  , 
which places the model squarely in the neoclassical tradition.
22. Good et al. (1996), Griliches (1994, 1995), and Hall (1996) provide 
detailed surveys of the empirical literature.
23. Hall (1996) offers a number of reasons why R&D might lead to 
production spillovers such as reverse engineering, migration of 
scientists and engineers, and free dissemination of public R&D. 
Grossman (1996, particularly pp. 86-8) emphasizes the differences 
between R&D capital and tangible capital.
24. See Griliches (1992) for a discussion of this distinction.
25. Good et al. (1996) state that “most of these recent studies point in 
the direction that there is some effect of R&D spillovers on the 
productivity growth of the receiving industry or economies” (p. 39). 
Griliches (1992) states that “in spite of many difficulties, there has 
been a significant number of reasonably well-done studies all pointing 
in the same direction: R&D spillovers are present, their magnitude 
may be quite large, and social rates of return remain significantly 
above private rates” (p. S43). 
26. The conference proceedings in Munnell (1990) explore this issue. 
Aaron (1990) is a good example of important critiques of the Aschauer 
findings. Gramlich (1994) and Binder and Smith (1996) provide more 
recent reviews.
27. Measurement problems may be more severe for government 
capital because there are no markets for many types of such capital, 
which makes estimation of user costs difficult.
α β 1 < +
28. One obvious difference between private and public investment is 
the financing mechanism. For example, the typical argument for 
government infrastructure investment is a traditional public-good 
argument that prevents returns from being recouped by the investor, 
which can lead to underprovision of the good. Gramlich (1990) 
discusses this in detail.
29. Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996) summarize earlier empirical work, 
Sichel (1997) provides a broad analysis of the impact of computers, 
and Triplett (1999a) presents a detailed critique of common 
explanations for the productivity paradox. Ultimately, one would like 
to answer a difficult counterfactual question—how fast would labor 
productivity have grown in the absence of computers?—but this is 
very difficult indeed. For example, the explosion of computing power 
occurred roughly contemporaneously with the well-known 
productivity slowdown, and one must distinguish the productivity 
impact of computers from the host of factors examined in that 
context. See Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1980), Baily and Gordon 
(1988), Baily and Schultze (1990), and Wolff (1996) for a few 
examples of the extensive literature on the productivity slowdown.
30. There is strong agreement that adjusting the output of computers 
for quality change is appropriate, but there are dissenting views. 
Denison (1989) argues specifically against constant-quality price 
indexes for computers.
31. See Baily and Gordon (1988), Stiroh (1998a), Gordon (2000), 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), and Oliner and Sichel (2000) for details 
on this fundamental distinction. This discussion is also relevant to the 
discussion of the renewed embodiment controversy below.
32. These empirical differences primarily reflect the time periods and 
output concepts. See Oliner and Sichel (2000) for details.
33. As an important caveat, Triplett (1996) shows that one must 
incorporate quality adjustments for all inputs to correctly allocate TFP 
across sectors to specific high-tech industries. His results suggest that 
falling prices of computers are in large part due to enormous technical 
progress in the production of semiconductors, a crucial intermediate 
input to computer production. See Oliner and Sichel (2000) for recent 
estimates.
34. Gordon (1989) provides a history of the early evolution of 
computers.Endnotes (Continued)
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35. Gordon (2000) summarizes this pessimistic view. Kiley (1999) 
presents a formal model of how computer investment could lower 
productivity due to large adjustment costs.
36. Reported relative price changes are based on Gordon (1990) and 
extended forward. This is a puzzling appeal to evidence, however, 
since the goal of Gordon’s monumental effort was to develop better 
output price measures and he explicitly states, “both input price and 
output price indexes treat quality change consistently” (p. 52). 
Moreover, this approach assumes no quality change in consumption 
goods, so measured relative price changes are more accurately thought 
of as the relative rate of technical change between these two.
37. In their introduction, Greenwood et al. (1997) seem to agree; they 
view their motivating facts as evidence of “significant technological 
change in the production of new equipment” (p. 342). Although they 
do calibrate a simple two-sector model, it is not fully integrated with 
their empirical work on the sources of growth and they reject it as an 
unreasonable explanation of balanced growth rates.
38. See Triplett (1989) for a survey.References
54 What Drives Productivity Growth? 
Aaron, Henry J. 1990. Discussion of “Why Is Infrastructure 
Important?” In Alicia H. Munnell, ed., Is There a Shortfall in 
Public Capital Investment? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Conference Series no. 34: 51-63.
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. 1998. Endogenous Growth 
Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1962. “The Economic Implications of Learning by 
Doing.” Review of Economic Studies 29 (June): 155-73.
Aschauer, David. 1989a. “Is Public Expenditure Productive?” Journal 
of Monetary Economics 23, no. 2: 177-200.
———. 1989b. “Does Public Capital Crowd out Private Capital?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 24, no. 2: 171-88.
———. 1990. “Why Is Infrastructure Important?” In Alicia H. 
Munnell, ed., Is There a Shortfall in Public Capital 
Investment? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference 
Series no. 34: 21-50.
Baily, Martin Neil, and Robert J. Gordon. 1988. “The Productivity 
Slowdown and Explosion of Computer Power.” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2: 1-45.
Baily, Martin Neil, and Charles L. Schultze. 1990. “The Productivity of 
Capital in a Period of Slower Growth.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Microeconomics (Special Issue): 369-406.
Barro, Robert J. 1990. “Government Spending in a Simple Model of 
Endogenous Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 5 
(part 2): S103-25.
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1995. Economic Growth. 
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Bartelsman, Eric J., Ricardo J. Caballero, and Richard K. Lyons. 1994. 
“Customer- and Supplier-Driven Externalities.” American 
Economic Review 84, no. 4 (September): 1075-84.
Basu, Susanto. 1996. Discussion of “Technology in Growth Theory.” 
In Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little, eds., Technology 
and Growth. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference 
Series no. 40: 78-82.
Basu, Susanto, and John G. Fernald. 1997. “Aggregate Productivity and 
Aggregate Technology.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System International Finance Discussion Paper no. 593.
Becker, Gary. 1962. “Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical 
Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 70, no. 5 (part 2): 9-49.
Berndt, Ernst R., and Catherine J. Morrison. 1995. “High-Tech Capital 
Formation and Economic Performance in U.S. Manufacturing 
Industries: An Exploratory Analysis.” Journal of Econometrics 
65, no. 1: 9-43.
Binder, Susan J., and Theresa M. Smith. 1996. “The Linkage between 
Transportation Infrastructure Investment and Productivity: A U.S. 
Federal Research Perspective.” In David F. Batten and Charlie 
Karlsson, eds., Transportation Infrastructure Investment 
and Productivity. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
Bresnahan, Timothy F. 1986. “Measuring the Spillovers from 
Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in the Financial 
Services.” American Economic Review 76, no. 4 (September): 
741-55.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Lorin Hitt. 1993. “Is Information Systems 
Spending Productive? New Evidence and New Results.” 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Information 
Systems, December.
———. 1995. “Information Technology as a Factor of Production: 
The Role of Differences among Firms.” Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 3, nos. 3-4: 183-99.
———. 1996. “Paradox Lost? Firm-Level Evidence on the Returns to 
Information Systems Spending.” Management Science 42, no. 4 
(April): 541-58.
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Shinkyu Yang. 1996. “Information Technology 
and Productivity: A Review of the Literature.” Advances in 
Computers 43 (February): 179-214.
———. 1997. “The Intangible Benefits and Costs of Computer 
Investments: Evidence from the Financial Markets.” Proceedings 
of the International Conference on Information Systems, 
December.References (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 55
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1998. “International Comparisons of 
Manufacturing Productivity and Unit Labor Cost Trends, 1997.” 
U.S. Department of Labor News Release no. 98-393, September 25.
———. 1999a. “Productivity and Costs, Preliminary Fourth-Quarter 
Measures and Annual Averages, 1998.” U.S. Department of Labor 
News Release no. 99-32, February 9.
———. 1999b. “Multifactor Productivity Trends.” U.S. Department 
of Labor News Release no. 99-36, February 11.
———. 2000a. “Multifactor Productivity Trends, 1998.” U.S. 
Department of Labor News Release no. 00-267, September 21.
———. 2000b. “Productivity and Costs, First Quarter 2000.” U.S. 
Department of Labor News Release no. 00-164, June 6.
Coe, David T., and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. “International R&D 
Spillovers.” European Economic Review 39, no. 5: 859-87.
Collins, Susan M., and Barry P. Bosworth. 1996. “Economic Growth in 
East Asia: Accumulation versus Assimilation.” Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, no. 2: 135-203.
Congressional Budget Office. 2000. “The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: Fiscal Years 2001-2010.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office.
David, Paul A. 1989. “Computer and Dynamo: The Modern 
Productivity Paradox in a Not-Too-Distant Mirror.” Center for 
Economic Policy Research Publication no. 172.
———. 1990. “The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical 
Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox.” American 
Economic Review 80, no. 2 (May): 35-61. Papers and Proceedings 
of the 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association.
DeLong, J. Bradford, and Lawrence H. Summers. 1991. “Equipment 
Investment and Economic Growth.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106, no. 2: 445-502.
———. 1992. “Equipment Investment and Economic Growth: How 
Strong Is the Nexus?” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, no. 2: 157-99.
———. 1993. “How Strongly Do Developing Countries Benefit from 
Equipment Investment?” Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 
no. 3: 395-415.
Denison, Edward F. 1962. Sources of Economic Growth in the 
U.S. and the Alternatives before Us. New York: Committee 
for Economic Development.
———. 1989. Estimates of Productivity Change by Industry. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Diewert, Erwin, and Kevin Fox. 1999. “Can Measurement Error 
Explain the Productivity Paradox?” Canadian Journal of 
Economics 32, no. 2 (April): 251-80.
Domar, Evsey. 1961. “On the Measurement of Technical Change.” 
Economic Journal 71, no. 284 (December): 709-29.
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 1980. “The Decline in Productivity 
Growth.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conferences Series
no. 22.
Fernald, John G. 1999. “Roads to Prosperity? Assessing the Link 
between Public Capital and Productivity.” American Economic 
Review 89, no. 3: 619-38.
Gera, Surendra, Wulong Gu, and Frank C. Lee. 1999. “Information 
Technology and Labour Productivity Growth: An Empirical 
Analysis for Canada and the United States.” Canadian Journal 
of Economics 32, no. 2 (April): 384-407.
Good, David H., M. Ishaq Nadiri, and Robin C. Sickles. 1996. “Index 
Number and Factor Demand Approaches to the Estimation of 
Productivity.” NBER Working Paper no. 5790.
Gordon, Robert J. 1989. “The Postwar Evolution of Computer Prices.” 
In Dale W. Jorgenson and Ralph Landau, eds., Technology and 
Capital Formation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
———. 1990. The Measurement of Durable Goods Prices. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1999a. “U.S. Economic Growth since 1870: What We Know 
and Still Need to Know.” American Economic Review 89, no. 2 
(May): 123-8. Papers and Proceedings of the 111th Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association.References (Continued)
56 What Drives Productivity Growth? 
———. 1999b. “Has the New Economy Rendered the Productivity 
Slowdown Obsolete?” Unpublished paper, Northwestern University.
———. 2000. “Does the ‘New Economy’ Measure up to the Great 
Inventions of the Past?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 
no. 4 (fall): 49-74.
Gramlich, Edward M. 1990. “How Should Public Infrastructure Be 
Financed?” In Alicia H. Munnell, ed., Is There a Shortfall in 
Public Capital Investment? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Conference Series no. 34: 222-37.
———. 1994. “Infrastructure Investments: A Review Essay.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 32 (September): 1176-96.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell. 1997. “Long-Run 
Implications of Investment-Specific Technological Change.” 
American Economic Review 87, no. 3 (June): 342-62.
Griliches, Zvi. 1960. “Measuring Inputs in Agriculture: A Critical Survey.” 
Journal of Farm Economics 42, no. 5 (December): 1411-27.
———. 1973. “Research Expenditures and Growth Accounting.” 
In B. R. Williams, ed., Science and Technology in Economic 
Growth. London: Macmillan.
———. 1979. “Issues in Assessing the Contribution of Research and 
Development to Productivity Growth.” Bell Journal of 
Economics 10, no. 1 (spring): 92-116.
———. 1992. “The Search for R&D Spillovers.” Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 94 (Supplement): 29-47.
———. 1994. “Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint.” 
American Economic Review 84, no. 1 (March): 1-23.
———. 1995. “R&D and Productivity: Econometric Results and 
Measurement Issues.” In P. Stoneman, ed., Handbook of the 
Economics of Innovation and Technological Change. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
———. 1996. “Education, Human Capital, and Growth: A Personal 
Perspective.” NBER Working Paper no. 5426.
Grossman, Gene M. 1996. Discussion of “Technology in Growth 
Theory.” In Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Jane Sneddon Little, eds., 
Technology and Growth. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Conference Series no. 40: 83-9.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1991. Innovation and 
Growth in the Global Economy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Gullickson, William, and Michael J. Harper. 1999. “Possible Measure-
ment Bias in Aggregate Productivity Growth.” Monthly Labor 
Review 122, no. 2 (February): 47-67.
Hall, Bronwyn H. 1996. “The Private and Social Returns to Research 
and Development.” In Bruce L. R. Smith and Claude E. Barfield, 
eds., Technology, R&D, and the Economy. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution and American Enterprise Institute.
Hall, Robert E., and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1967. “Tax Policy and 
Investment Behavior.” American Economic Review 57, no. 3 
(June): 391-414.
Hercowitz, Zvi. 1998. “The Embodiment Controversy: A Review 
Essay.” Journal of Monetary Economics 41, no. 1: 217-24.
Ho, Mun Sing, and Dale W. Jorgenson. 1999. “The Quality of the U.S. 
Workforce, 1948-1995.” Unpublished paper, Harvard University.
Hsieh, Chang-Tai. 1997. “What Explains the Industrial Revolution in 
East Asia? Evidence from Factor Markets.” Unpublished paper, 
University of California at Berkeley, November.
———. 1999. “Productivity Growth and Factor Prices in East Asia.” 
American Economic Review 89, no. 2 (May): 133-8. Papers and 
Proceedings of the 111th Annual Meeting of the American 
Economic Association.
Hulten, Charles R. 1979. “On the Importance of Productivity Change.” 
American Economic Review 69, no. 1 (March): 126-36.
———. 1992. “Growth Accounting When Technical Change Is 
Embodied in Capital.” American Economic Review 82, no. 4 
(September): 964-80.References (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 57
———.  2000. “Total Factor Productivity: A Short Biography.” 
NBER Working Paper no. 7471, January.
Jones, Charles I. 1995a. “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth.” 
Journal of Political Economy 103 (August): 759-84.
———. 1995b. “Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (May): 495-525.
———. 1999. “Growth: With or without Scale Effects.” American 
Economic Review 89, no. 2 (May): 139-44. Papers and Proceedings 
of the 111th Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association.
Jones, Charles I., and John C. Williams. 1998. “Measuring the Social 
Return to R&D.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 63, no. 4 
(November): 1119-36.
Jorgenson, Dale W. 1966. “The Embodiment Hypothesis.” Journal of 
Political Economy 74, no. 1 (February): 1-17.
———. 1990. “Productivity and Economic Growth.” In Ernst R. 
Berndt and Jack E. Triplett, eds., Fifty Years of Economic 
Measurement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1996. “Technology in Growth Theory.” In Jeffrey C. Fuhrer 
and Jane Sneddon Little, eds., Technology and Growth. Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series no. 40: 45-77.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Zvi Griliches. 1967. “The Explanation of 
Productivity Change.” Review of Economic Studies 34, no. 99 
(July): 249-80.
Jorgenson, Dale W., and Kevin J. Stiroh. 1999. “Information 
Technology and Growth.” American Economic Review 89, no. 2 
(May): 109-15. Papers and Proceedings of the 111th Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association.
———. 2000. “Raising the Speed Limit: U.S. Economic Growth in 
the Information Age.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, no. 1: 125-211.
Keller, Wolfgang. 1998. “Are International R&D Spillovers Trade-
Related? Analyzing Spillovers among Randomly Matched Trade 
Partners.” European Economic Review 42, no. 8: 1469-81.
Kiley, Michael T. 1999. “Computers and Growth with Costs of 
Adjustment: Will the Future Look Like the Past?” Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series no. 36, July.
Kortum, Samuel. 1997. “Research, Patenting, and Technological 
Change.” Econometrica 65, no. 6 (November): 1389-419.
Kremer, Michael. 1993. “Population Growth and Technological 
Change: One Million B.C. to 1990.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 108, no. 3 (August): 681-716.
Krugman, Paul. 1994. “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle.” Foreign Affairs 
73, no. 6 (November-December): 62-78.
Lehr, Bill, and Frank Lichtenberg. 1999. “Information Technology and 
Its Impact on Firm-Level Productivity: Evidence from 
Government and Private Data Sources, 1977-1993.” Canadian 
Journal of Economics 32, no. 2: 335-62.
Lichtenberg, Frank R. 1995. “The Output Contribution of Computer 
Equipment and Personnel: A Firm-Level Analysis.” Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 3, nos. 3-4: 201-17.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1988. “On the Mechanics of Economic Develop-
ment.” Journal of Monetary Economics 22, no 1: 3-42.
Maclean, Dinah. 1997. “Lagging Productivity Growth in the Service 
Sector: Mismeasurement, Mismanagement, or Misinfomation?” 
Bank of Canada Working Paper no. 97-6.
Mankiw, N. Gregory. 1995. “The Growth of Nations.” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1: 275-326.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David Weil. 1992. “A 
Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economic Growth 107, no. 2 (May): 407-38.
McGuckin, Robert H., and Kevin J. Stiroh. 1998. “Computers, 
Productivity, and Growth.” Conference Board Economic Research 
Report no. 1213-98-RR.
McGuckin, Robert H., Mary L. Streitwieser, and Mark Doms. 1998. “The 
Effect of Technology Use on Productivity Growth.” Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 7, no. 1: 1-26.References (Continued)
58 What Drives Productivity Growth? 
Mincer, Jacob. 1958. “Investment on Human Capital and Personal 
Income Distribution.” Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 4: 
281-302.
———. 1974. Schooling, Experience, and Earnings. New York: 
Columbia University Press and National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
Morrison, Catherine J. 1997. “Assessing the Productivity of Information 
Technology Equipment in U.S. Manufacturing Industries.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 79 (August): 471-81.
Munnell, Alicia H., ed. 1990. Is There a Shortfall in Public 
Capital Investment? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Conference Series no. 34.
Oliner, Stephen D., and Daniel E. Sichel. 2000. “The Resurgence of 
Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 4 (fall): 3-22.
Parry, Robert T. 2000. “Implications of Productivity Uncertainty for 
Monetary Policy.” Business Economics 35, no. 1 (January): 13-5.
Rodrick, Dani. 1997. “TFPG Controversies, Institutions, and 
Economic Performance in East Asia.” NBER Working Paper
no. 5914, February.
Romer, Paul. 1986. “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth.” 
Journal of Political Economy 94, no. 5 (October): 1002-37.
———. 1990. “Endogenous Technological Change.” Journal of 
Political Economy 98, no. 5 (part 2): S71-101.
———. 1994. “The Origins of Endogenous Growth.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 8, no. 1 (winter): 3-22.
Schultz, Theodore W. 1961. “Investment in Human Capital.” 
American Economic Review 51, no. 1 (March): 1-17.
Segerstrom, Paul S. 1998. “Endogenous Growth without Scale Effects.” 
American Economic Review 88, no. 5 (December): 1290-310.
Sichel, Daniel E. 1997. The Computer Revolution: An Economic 
Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Siegel, Donald. 1997. “The Impact of Computers on Manufacturing 
Productivity Growth: A Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes 
Approach.” Review of Economics and Statistics 1 (February): 
68-78.
Siegel, Donald, and Zvi Griliches. 1992. “Purchased Services, 
Outsourcing, Computers, and Productivity in Manufacturing.” 
In Zvi Griliches, ed., Output Measurement in the Service 
Sector. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Solow, Robert M. 1956. “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic 
Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, no. 1 
(February): 56-94.
———. 1957. “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function.” Review of Economics and Statistics 39, no. 3: 
313-30.
———. 1960. “Investment and Technical Progress.” In Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Samuel Karlin, and Patrick Suppes, eds., Mathematical 
Methods in the Social Sciences. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press.
Steindel, Charles. 1992. “Manufacturing Productivity and High-Tech 
Investment.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly 
Review, summer: 39-47.
Stiroh, Kevin J. 1998a. “Computers, Productivity, and Input 
Substitution.” Economic Inquiry 36, no. 2 (April): 175-91.
———. 1998b. “Long-Run Growth Projections and the Aggregate 
Production Function: A Survey of Models Used by the U.S. 
Government.” Contemporary Economic Policy 16 (October): 
467-79.
Triplett, Jack E. 1989. “Price and Technological Change in a Capital 
Good: A Survey of Research on Computers.” In Dale W. Jorgenson 
and Ralph Landau, eds., Technology and Capital Formation. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
———. 1996. “High-Tech Industry Productivity and Hedonic Price 
Indices.” OECD Proceedings: Industry Productivity, 
International Comparison, and Measurement Issues, 119-42.References (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 59
———. 1999a. “The Solow Productivity Paradox: What Do 
Computers Do to Productivity?” Canadian Journal of 
Economics 32, no. 2 (April): 309-34.
———. 1999b. “Economic Statistics, the New Economy, and the 
Productivity Slowdown.” Business Economics 34, no. 2 (April): 
13-7.
Whelan, Karl. 2000. “Computers, Obsolescence, and Productivity.” 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series no. 6.
Wolff, Edward N. 1996. “The Productivity Slowdown: The Culprit at 
Last? Follow-Up on Hulten and Wolff.” American Economic 
Review 86, no. 5: 1239-52.
Young, Alwyn. 1995. “The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the 
Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience.” Journal 
of Quarterly Economics 110, no. 3 (August): 641-80.
———. 1998a. “Growth without Scale Effects.” Journal of 
Political Economy 106, no. 1: 41-63.
———. 1998b. “Alternative Estimates of Productivity Growth in the 
NICs: A Comment on the Findings of Chang-Tai Hsieh.” NBER 
Working Paper no. 6657.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or 
implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose of any 
information contained in documents produced and provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in any form or 
manner whatsoever.